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Recent Decisions 




by John Jeffrey Ross 
When a merchant executes a security 
agreement with his financier without 
specifying that "after acquired property" 
shall serve as collateral, a valid security 
interest is nonetheless created in that 
merchant's inventory, present and future, 
when the document shows the intent to 
cover "floor plan" or inventory financing. 
This is the salient holding of a recent 
Court of Appeals decision in answer to 
questions certified from the United States 
District Court for Maryland. Frankel v. 
Associates Financial Services, Inc., 281 
Md. 172,377 A.2d 1166 (1977). 
The parties, an Article Nine creditor 
and a trustee in bankruptcy, were before 
the court after a bankruptcy adjudication 
in the matter of the Prince George's Truck 
Center. The District Court certified the 
following questions of law to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §§12-601-609 (1974): 
1. Did the security interest created 
. . . attach to that property 
repossessed by [creditorl. which prop-
erty was acquired by the [bankrupt 
Truck Center] after the [security] 
Agreement was signed? 
2. Where financing statements were 
properly filed in the local circuit court 
prior to the 1971 amendment to Mary-
land Code (1957, 1964 Rep!. Vol.) Art 
95B, §9-401 changing the require-
ments regarding place of filing did the 
filing of a superfluous subse~uent fi-
nancing statement in the local circuit 
court in ... 1973, rather than with 
the State Department of Assessments 
and Taxation [as required by the 
amended code] adversely affect any 
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prior perfection of the security in-
terest? 
281 Md. at 174 , 377 A.2d at 1167. 
When a commercial entity passes away 
there can be a spectacular series of dis-
putes over the spoils. Often the litigants 
are a secured creditor whose rights are 
dictated by Article Nine of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and a trustee in 
bankruptcy existing pursuant to 11 
U.s.c. §1 et seq. (The Bankruptcy Act). 
Essentially, a bankruptcy trustee is to 
bring order to the financial affairs of the 
bankrupt debtor's estate. She must con-
solidate that estate and attempt to dis-
tribute the remaining assets to the cred-
itors on an equitable basis. If one creditor 
is preferred, the others, of course, suffer 
from this favored distribution. Especially 
subservient to the consolidation and then 
redistribution of the bankrupt's assets is 
the creditor without any promise of 
security to buttress his loan. On the other 
hand, a secured creditor may present a 
valid claim to recover the entire amount 
of collateral due on the basis of her loan. 
The secured creditor goes to the head of 
the line, in effect, to recoup all of her out-
lay in financing the bankrupt's business. 
Security thus able to withstand the 
vacuum left by bankruptcy, a vacuum 
filled by the unprotected creditors, must 
be established properly ("perfected") orit 
too shall be included in the trust. As 
White and Summers have indicated at 
page 865 in their text on the Uniform 
Commercial Code: "[T]he acid test of the 
quality of an Article Nine security interest 
is its capacity to survive trustee attack." 
On June 10,1970, the Prince George's 
Truck Center executed a Wholesale 
Security Agreement with Associates Fi-
nancial Services which covered "all of 
[the Truck Center's] collateral" and "pro-
ceeds thereof whether or not identifiable, 
and the value thereof." This agreement, 
of course, represented the bargain of the 
parties to grant a security interest in the 
designated property. See 48 Temple L.Q. 
833. 
Subsequent to this, on 12 June, the 
parties filed a financing statement with 
the clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George's County. Further statements 
were recorded in the court on January 14, 
1971 and November 12, 1973. 
On February 18, 1975, the Truck 
Center transferred 19 trucks to Financial 
Services which had financed their 
purchase the prior year and for which Fi-
nancial remained unpaid. Four months 
later, on June 17, 1975, the Truck Center 
was adjudged bankrupt . 
Roger Frankel, appointed trustee in 
bankruptcy, attempted to recover these 
trucks for the estate in bankruptcy. He 
contended that their transfer to the lender 
was a voidable preference under §60 of 
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.s.c. §96), 
which reads in pertinent part: 
§60(a) (1) A preference is a transfer as 
defined in this Act, of any of the pr~p­
erty of a debtor to or for the benefit of a 
creditor for or on account of an antece-
dent debt, made or suffered by such 
debtor while insolvent and within four 
months before the filing by or against 
him of the petition intitiating a pro-
ceeding under the [Bankruptcy] Act, 
the effect of which transfer will enable 
such creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than some other 
creditors of the same class. (emphasis 
supplied). 
The preferential transfer of the 19-truck 
collateral to the secured lender gave Fi-
nancial Associates a proportionately 
greater slice of the estate than the other 
creditors. In arguing that the transfer was 
voidable and ineffective to prevent the in-
clusion of the trucks into the trust in 
bankruptcy Frankel stated that "the 
Security interest created by the 
'Wholesale Security Agreement' . . . did 
not attach to that property repossessed by 
[Financial Associates], which property 
was acquired during 1974, after the 
Wholesale Security Agreement was ex-
ecuted." Trustee's brief at 5 (emphasis 
supplied). Trustee Frankel urged that the 
1970 agreement's extension to the 1975 
truck repossessions was frustrated by the 
failure of the parties to specify, as sup-
posedly contemplated by Maryland COM 
MERCIAL LAW CODE ANN. (1975) §9-204, 
that the agreement shall cover after ac-
quired property; He insisted that the 
Code required that the intended collateral 
must be made clear: 
(1) A security interest cannot attach 
until there is agreement that it attach 
and value is given and the debtor has 
rights in the collateral. . . 
(3) Except as provided in [another sec-
tion not relevant here] a sec uri ty agree-
ment may provide that collateral, 
whenever acquired, shall secure all 
obligations covered by the security 
agreement. 
An interest in after acquired property, a 
fortiori specifically unidentifiable at the 
creation of the security agreement, is the 
notorious "floating lien". The trustee's 
arguments against this type of security 
find sympathy in what section three of the 
Official Comments to §9-204 describes as 
a prejudicial attitude against allowing a 
commercial borrower to "encumber all his 
assets, present and future." The commit-
ment of future assets may be thought to 
cast an umbra of hardship on the debtor; 
such unfairness is mitigated by the ex-
plicit articulation of what shall be utilized 
as collateral. 
Neither the unfavored view of this 
"continued general lien" nor the explicit-
ness demanded by the trustee survive the 
court's reading of §9-204. The following 
passage expresses the law in Maryland, an 
effective "YES" answer to the first cer-
tified question: 
We reject the notion that the security 
agreement must specifically contain the 
talisman of "after acquired property", 
or its equivilant, however phrased, and 
prefer instead to interpret the agree-
ment in the light of trade custom and 
commercial practice. It seems to us that 
. . . a continuing relation was con-
templated, in which the lender's lien 
extended to the collateral, as it might 
exist from time to time, until the 
indebtedness was satisfied. 
281 Md. at 176, 377 A.2d at 1168. Thus, 
although the "inartfully drafted" security 
agreement was viewed as inadequate for 
§9-204 purposes by the hypertechnical 
eye of a trustee in bankruptcy charged 
with the vigorous consolidation of all of 
the debtor's assets, the court reasonably 
perceived a clear intent by the parties to 
secure a collateral which remains in a 
state of flux, as inventory necessarily 
must. 
In In re Page, 16 U.c.c. Rep. 501 
(M.D. Fla. 1974), the trustee in 
bankruptcy argued that the security 
agreement which failed to state "after ac-
quired property" placed a clear and 
unambiguous limit on the collateral 
covered and should not have been altered 
by the court to include assets not de-
scribed in the agreement. In finding a 
valid "floating lien" prevalent over the 
trustee's claims the court noted that 
[t]he fallacy of this argument should be 
evident if one considers the nature and 
character of the collateral. . . Needless 
to say, any reasonable secured party 
would be fully aware that this type of 
business presupposes a constant change 
in the inventory. 
To attribute and adopt the narrow con-
struction urged by the trustee would 
destroy all inventory financing unless 
the security agreement and the financ-
ing statement include an after acquired 
clause. This approach is contrary to the 
general liberal philosophy of the Code 
and certainly is contrary to the cur-
rently prevailing and accepted com-
mercial practice of financing retail 
merchandising businesses. 
16 U.C.C. Rep. at 504-505. 
It is thus clear that a security interest 
resulting from payments for Floor Plan 
Advances, increases in, or replacement of 
inventory, can only reasonably mean the 
intent to attach a floating lien. See HEN-
SON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 44 ("invento-
ry . . . includes after acquired col-
lateral"); 48 Temple L.Q. at 835 (creditor 
would not be willing to let his security 
evaporate as it is sold). See also Whit-
worth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, -, 558 
P.2d 1026, 1031-1032 (term "replace-
ments" enough to create after acquired 
interest) . 
His first argument rejected, the trustee 
in Frankel next contended that the second 
certified question should be answered in 
the affirmative because the creditor filed 
his third Financing Statement at the 
wrong place; the security interest lost its 
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perfected status, and thus could not pre-
vail over the trustee's inclusion into the 
bankrupt's estate. On July 1, 1971 
§9-401 was amended to change the 
proper place for filing' a financial state-
ment from the circuit courts to the State 
Department of Assessments and Taxation. 
Instead of filing the third statement with 
the Department, the creditor acted as he 
had the first two instances and filed this 
final statement with the Circuit Court. 
The basic issue here was whether the final 
statement modified the earlier filings. In 
rejection of the trustee's argument, the 
court conceded that the third filing was 
ineffective, but that under §9-401 (d) such 





by Thomas G. Ross 
Lawrence C. Dominic, Esq. 
The August 30, 1977 decision in Mead 
Data Central, Inc. v. United States 
Department of the Air Force, et 0/. (No. 
75-2218), __ U.S.App.D.C. __ , 
__ F.2d __ , concerned the' ap-
plicability and scope of exemption five of 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 
U.s.c. §552(b)(5)(1970 Supp. V 1975). 
The appellant appealed from a summary 
judgment in favor of the Air Force in 
which the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia denied Mead Data's re-
quest for an injunction to compel the Air 
Force to disclose the contents of seven 
documents relating to a licensing agree-
ment between the Air Force and the West 
Publishing Company. The court held that 
the requested documents were not subject 
to disclosure because the fifth of nine ex-
emptions enumerated within the FOIA 
speCifically protected the Air Force 
against mandatory release of the docu-
ments. 
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA was in-
tended to increase public access to 
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government records and to encourage 
agency responsibility. Congress, through 
the Act, changed its policy from one 
favoring nondisclosure of governmental 
information (under the Administrative 
Procedure Act [APA] of 1946) to one of 
mandatory disclosure. Whereas the APA 
was very restrictive and often abused, re-
quiring access only to "persons properly 
and directly concerned" with the matter, 
the FOIA mandates disclosure of identifia-
ble governmental records to "any person" 
requesting them, subject to the nine 
specific exemptions, and provides for 
judicial remedy for a government agen-
cy's improper withholding of information. 
86 HARv. L. REV. 1047-1048 (1973). 
The United States Supreme Court in 
N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 421 
U.S. 132 (1975), held that the "purpose 
of the [FOIA] is to establish a general 
philosophy of full agency disclosure 
unless information is exempted under 
clearly delineated statutory language" 
and that the Act's intent was to assure the 
public's right of access to virtually all 
governmental agency documents. The 
Court reiterated its position on the FOIA's 
function in Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352 (1976), holding that "dis-
closure, not secrecy, is the dominant ob-
jective of the Act." 
Congress did, however, recognize the 
need to allow government agencies the 
right of nondisclosure for certain docu-
ments. The information, to be protected, 
must be within one of the following nine 
specific exemptions: 
1. national defense or foreign policy 
interests; 
2. agency's internal personnel rules 
and practices; 
3. specific statutory exemption; 
4. trade secrets; 
5. inter-agency or intra-agency 
memoranda; 
6. invasion of personal privacy; 
7. investigatory files for law enforce-
ment purposes; 
8. regulation of financial institutions; 
and 
9. information concerning oil wells. 
See 5 U.s.c. §§552(b)(1) through (9). 
In Mead Data, the Air Force was suc-
cessful at the trial court level after assert-
ing a claim that the seven documents re-
quested by Mead Data were privileged in 
that they fell within exemption five of the 
FOIA. That exemption, at 5 U.s.C. 
§552(b)(5), states: 
[The Act does not apply to] inter-agen-
cy or intra-agency memoranda or let-
ters which would not be available by 
law to a party other than an agency in 
litigation with the agency. 
The broad and unclear language of ex-
emption five thrusts upon the courts a 
major role in the administration of the 
Act. 86 HARv. L. REV. at 1066-67 (1973). 
The two basic defense claims that can be 
made to invoke the privilege under this 
exemption are the attorney-client priv-
ilege and the privilege protecting those 
memoranda involved in the deliberation 
and deCision-making governmental pro-
cess. See generally C. M. Marvick (Ed.), 
Litigation Under the Amended Freedom 
of Information Act (ACLU 1976). 
The seven documents that Mead Data 
sought to have disclosed dealt with an Air 
Force project involving a computerized 
legal research system. Of these, the Air 
Force claimed that three were legal opin-
ions in which Air Force attorneys were ad-
vising their client as to applicable law 
concerning contract negotiations. The Air 
Force further asserted that the other four 
documents were privileged as internal 
memoranda prepared by its employees. 
Mead Data argued that the information 
requested was purely factual and thus 
subject to disclosure, while the Air Force 
asserted that it consisted of adViSory opin-
ions and deliberations protected from dis-
closure by exemption five. 
The circuit court agreed with the trial 
court's ruling that both the attorney-client 
and deliberative process privileges are in-
corporated into exemption five. However, 
it reversed the judgment of the district 
court due to its "impermissibly broad in-
terpretation" of these privileges and re-
manded for a decision based on narrower 
constructions outlined in the case. No. 
75-2218 slip op. at 34. The court noted 
that the congressional intent was that the 
exemption be applied "as narrowly as 
consistent with efficient government 
operation." Id., at 11, n. 16; S. Rep. No. 
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). 
